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In recent years, a perspective on adolescent
risk-taking derived from developmen-
tal neuroscience has become increasingly
popular. This perspective, referred to as
the “dual systems model” (Somerville
et al., 2010; Steinberg, 2010) or some-
times the “maturational imbalance the-
ory” (Casey et al., 2011), posits that
increased risk-taking during adolescence
is due to a combination of heightened
reward sensitivity and immature impulse
control, which are tied to the develop-
ment of two brain systems that undergo
significant change during this age period,
but that develop along different timeta-
bles. One system, which has been called
the “socioemotional” incentive process-
ing system (Steinberg, 2010; Chein et al.,
2011) or “ventral affective system” (Pfeifer
and Allen, 2012), is localized mainly
in the ventral striatum and ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex. The second system,
referred to as the “cognitive control” sys-
tem (Steinberg, 2010; Chein et al., 2011)
or “prefrontal control system” (Pfeifer and
Allen, 2012), is localized mainly in lat-
eral prefrontal, parietal, and anterior cin-
gulate cortices (Wager and Smith, 2003;
Owen et al., 2005). Briefly, the dual systems
(DS) perspective posits that risk-taking
during mid-adolescence is the product of
the heightened reactivity of the socioe-
motional system against a backdrop of
still maturing cognitive control. With fur-
ther maturation, the socioemotional sys-
tem becomes less reactive and the cognitive
control system becomes stronger andmore
efficient. Together, these changes lead to
an increase in risk taking during adoles-
cence followed by a decrease in risk taking
as individuals move into adulthood.
A recent article (Pfeifer and Allen,
2012) critiques the DS model. The authors
make three main points: (1) that the data
do not support the DS model because
there are too few studies assessing the
relationship between development in each
brain system and patterns of “real-world”
behavior; (2) that activation of the socioe-
motional system is sometimes associated
with adaptive functioning, that activation
of the cognitive control system is some-
times associated with maladaptive func-
tioning, and that these pieces of evidence
are contrary to the DS model; and (3) that
patterns of brain development are more
complex than those described by the DS
theory.
As proponents of the DS perspective
on adolescent risk taking, we welcome the
opportunity to respond to the Pfeifer and
Allen critique. While, we agree that pre-
sentations of the model have sometimes
oversimplified the evidence or overlooked
inconsistencies in the literature, we believe
that the framework continues to offer
a useful model for understanding risky
behavior in adolescence. In the absence of
an alternative theoretical account, which
Pfeifer and Allen do not offer, the DS
model provides a useful heuristic for the
formulation of testable hypotheses.
Pfeifer and Allen (2012) make sev-
eral excellent points about the model’s
limitations and the challenges of map-
ping neuroimaging findings onto specific
theoretical claims. However, in our view,
there are three main shortcomings in their
critique. First and foremost, the authors
fail to acknowledge that there is con-
siderable behavioral evidence consistent
with the predictions of the DS model.
Reward sensitivity follows an inverted U-
shaped curve (Steinberg et al., 2009;
Romer, 2010; Harden and Tucker-Drob,
2011). In a large behavioral study of
10- to 30-year-olds, participants’ self-
report indicated a peak in sensation-
seeking during mid-adolescence
(Steinberg et al., 2009), and on a gam-
bling task, participants’ behavior was
most influenced by rewarding stimuli
during this same age period (Cauffman
et al., 2010). In contrast, impulse con-
trol increases gradually and linearly, and
the peak in performance on tasks mea-
suring capabilities like planning and
response inhibition occurs subsequent
to the peak in reward sensitivity. This
linear trajectory has been demonstrated
in self-reports of impulsive behavior
in several large-scale studies (Steinberg
et al., 2009; Harden and Tucker-Drob,
2011). Additionally there is compelling
evidence from behavioral studies of cog-
nitive control, which demonstrate that
performance improves gradually over the
course of adolescence and does not peak
until late adolescence (Luna, 2009; Albert
and Steinberg, 2011). Furthermore, both
impulsivity (Verdejo-García et al., 2008)
and reward/sensation-seeking (Galvan
et al., 2007; Romer, 2010) are correlated
with self-reported risk-taking.
Importantly, the brain systems pre-
sumed to mediate these constructs fol-
low similar developmental trajectories.
The remodeling of dopaminergic pathways
connecting the ventral striatum to the PFC
is most pronounced shortly after puberty,
just before the rise in reward sensitivity
(Spear, 2009; Luciana and Collins, 2012).
In contrast, the prefrontal and parietal cor-
tices, which are thought to support age-
related improvements in cognitive control
(Luna and Sweeney, 2001; Bunge et al.,
2002; Astle and Scerif, 2009; Luna et al.,
2010), are among the last brain regions to
mature (Huttenlocher, 1990; Giedd et al.,
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1999; Bitan et al., 2006). The value of
the DS theory is that it provides an inte-
grated account for the observed changes in
risk-taking, in the psychological constructs
presumed to contribute to risk-taking, and
in the structural and functional neural
changes presumed to contribute to the
psychological changes.
Pfeifer and Allen (2012) are correct that
there are few studies that assess, within
the same experimental sample, correla-
tions among real-world behavior, associ-
ated psychological functioning, and the
presumed structural and functional neu-
ral substrates of these phenomena—but
this is surely not a shortcoming unique
to this area of inquiry. Indeed, the neu-
roimaging literature as a whole includes
very few studies with an adequate sam-
ple to support strong conclusions about
brain-behavior correlations, and serious
objections have been raised about the
potential for spurious conclusions to arise
when small sample sizes are used (Yarkoni,
2009; Vul and Pashler, 2012). Even when
a substantial correlation actually exists
between brain activation in some particu-
lar region and behavior in the population,
an atypically large fMRI sample is needed
for a fair chance of detecting the effect
[e.g., With a correlation of r = 0.5, 60 par-
ticipants would be needed to give an 80%
chance of detecting the effect at a statistical
threshold of p < 0.001 (Yarkoni, 2009)].
Given that developmental MRI studies
almost universally have sample sizes of
fewer than 40 participants per age group,
evaluating the DS model based on how
well-individual differences in brain acti-
vation predict real world behaviors is an
unreasonable criterion. It is fair to say
that the DS model has seldom been tested
in predictions of real world behavior, but
untested is not the same as inaccurate.
Pointing out that two different aspects
of development (brain and behavior) fol-
low similar trajectories is, admittedly, not
evidence that one trajectory causes the
other, but neither is it merely argument by
analogy, as Pfeifer and Allen (2012) assert.
It strikes us as more than coincidental that
patterns of behavior in adolescence fol-
low a developmental course matching that
observed in brain systems presumed to
undergird these behaviors. As it becomes
possible and more common to collect data
from larger samples, it will be possible to
examine brain-behavior relations through
individual differences analyses. We note,
however, that real-world behaviors are
undoubtedly subserved by interacting and
distributed brain networks, not just indi-
vidual brain regions, and there is not cur-
rently a consensus on an analytic approach
for exploring correlations between acti-
vations in interactive networks and con-
comitant behavior. Moreover, real-world
risk-taking is influenced by a wide array
of contextual variables that cannot be con-
trolled in the lab.
Second, the authorsmischaracterize the
DS model as built on the assumption that
activation of the socioemotional system is
always maladaptive and activation of the
cognitive control system is always adaptive;
to our knowledge no such assertions have
ever been made by proponents of the DS
view. Perhaps this assertion arises in the
popular press, but we don’t believe it is
a characteristic of scientific writings that
employ this framework. The DS model
is agnostic with respect to whether the
developmental changes in brain structure
or function produce desirable or unde-
sirable consequences. Even, if the neural
changes of adolescence impel individu-
als to take more risks, not all risk tak-
ing is undesirable; indeed, one of the
central propositions of the framework is
that the heightened risk taking seen dur-
ing adolescence is an evolutionarily adap-
tive phenomenon. The hyper-responsivity
to reward that characterizes adolescents
relative to children and adults in many
studies of reward processing (Ernst et al.,
2005; Galvan et al., 2006; Geier et al.,
2010; van Leijenhorst et al., 2010a,b;
Chein et al., 2011; Christakou et al., 2011;
Padmanabhan et al., 2011; Smith et al.,
2011; Somerville et al., 2011) is nei-
ther inherently maladaptive nor inherently
adaptive; to quote an overused colloquial-
ism, “it is what it is.” In some individuals
this may lead to maladaptive sensation-
seeking, or drug use, or unprotected sex.
In others, it may lead to more intense
attempts to win the admiration of others,
earn money, or do well in school. Rewards
come in many forms, some socially val-
ued, and others undesirable. Similarly, we
find no descriptions of the DS theory
which assert that more cognitive control
is always more adaptive. The improved
ability to imagine the future seen among
older adolescents permits individuals to
make more informed decisions, but it also
enables them to ruminate, sometimes to
a degree that may lead to or exacerbate
depression.
Third, Pfeifer and Allen (2012) point
out that there are findings that run counter
to predictions derived from the DS model.
It is hard to think of any theory of human
development for which there are no incon-
sistent findings; a complete absence of
inconsistency in the literature is an unre-
alistic criterion against which to evalu-
ate a theory’s utility. Over time, findings
that are inconsistent with other studies or
with predictions derived from a particu-
lar theory inevitably arise. In evaluating
these instances, the chief considerations
should be (1) whether the inconsistencies
in the theory can be explained through
more nuanced analyses or by refining the
theory; (2) whether the putative incon-
sistencies are incompatible with what the
theory actually predicts, rather than with
mischaracterizations of the theory; and (3)
whether there are so many inconsistencies
that the theory is no longer useful.
The question of whether reward sen-
sitivity is heightened during adolescence
illustrates the first of these points nicely.
While, it had once appeared as if findings
on this issue were all over the map (with
some studies finding adolescent hypersen-
sitivity to reward, some finding adolescent
hyposensitivity, and others finding no age
differences), an accumulation of evidence
has made it clear that adolescents most
often evince a greater response to reward-
ing stimuli as compared to adults (Ernst
et al., 2005; Galvan et al., 2006; Geier
et al., 2010; van Leijenhorst et al., 2010a,b;
Chein et al., 2011; Christakou et al., 2011;
Padmanabhan et al., 2011; Smith et al.,
2011; Somerville et al., 2011). Further,
recent analyses have shown that consid-
eration of the stage of the reward pro-
cessing under examination (Galvan, 2010;
Geier et al., 2010) may provide an expla-
nation for those few studies (Bjork et al.,
2004, 2011) that find a different pattern of
results.
The second issue regarding inconsis-
tencies is illustrated by Pfeifer and Allen’s
(2012) assertion that the DS theory pre-
dicts that one should see greater activa-
tion of prefrontal regions with age. This
is not a prediction that comes from the
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DS theory. The expected relationships
between age and activation depend on the
task demands. The DS model predicts that
when a task and the method of analysis
provide an index of the tendency to engage
cognitive control, PFC activation should
be weaker on average among adolescents
relative to adults. This is generally what
one finds, for instance, if one examines the
subset of studies exploring age-dependent
PFC activation during working memory
task performance, as reviewed by Crone
and Dahl (2012), for which the majority of
studies demonstrate a pattern of increasing
PFC activity with age. In contrast, when a
task and the associated method of analy-
sis provide an index of the efficiency with
which control is achieved, then PFC acti-
vation would be expected to be greater on
average for adolescents relative to adults.
Of course, determining whether, a specific
approach provides an index of tendency
or efficiency is not a simple undertaking
because even subtly varying factors (e.g.,
proportion of targets to lures, degree of
proactive interference, stimulus, and feed-
back timing, shape of assumed hemody-
namic model, etc.) are known to affect
how a task functions. Engaging in care-
ful task analysis, garnering support from
converging methodologies (e.g., behavior,
ERP, computational modeling), and run-
ning larger sample sizes to allow greater
exploration of brain-behavior relation-
ships, might be useful ways to overcome
this challenge.
There is behavioral evidence that is
consistent with the DS model’s prediction
that both more and less PFC activation
(relative to adults) can reflect immatu-
rity. Depending on the experimental con-
text, behavioral improvements in cognitive
control have been associated with both
more and with less activation within cog-
nitive control circuitry (Velanova et al.,
2009; Luna et al., 2010). Evidently, neu-
ral “maturation” in this realm means
something more complex than “more”
or “less” activation. Although, more sys-
tematic study is needed, it is likely that
improvements in cognitive control are
supported primarily by increases in struc-
tural and functional connectivity across
and between cortical and subcortical
regions (Olesen et al., 2003; Liston et al.,
2006; Vincent et al., 2008; Schmithorst
and Yuan, 2010). We anticipate that more
clarity regarding the relationship between
age-related improvements in cognitive
control and brain activation will emerge as
methods for assessing structural and func-
tional connectivity improve (Dosenbach
et al., 2010).
Having new tools to investigate the rela-
tionship between brain and behavior may
allow us to make important advances, but
in the absence of a testable theory we
can’t expect that much will be learned. We
believe the DS model still serves an impor-
tant purpose, in that it yields specific and
testable predictions. We further, contend
that there are fewer caveats and contradic-
tory findings than have been implied by
Pfeifer and Allen (2012), and indeed that
there are many other sources of affirma-
tive evidence for the DS model. Because
the DS model took its original form from
behavioral science it is to be expected that
the model is not yet fully specified with
respect to patterns of brain function. There
is a complex mapping between psycho-
logical constructs and their neural under-
pinnings, and we anticipate that further
specification of the model will become
possible as the field develops refined ways
to integrate behavioral and neuroscien-
tific sources of evidence. We welcome fur-
ther attempts to confirm, or disconfirm,
aspects of the DS model, as well as the
introduction of alternative theories that
might better account for the phenomenol-
ogy of adolescent risk behavior.
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